Call to a New Life: HDP on eve of general elections

2015-02-13 11:28:47

ANKARA (DİHA) - The following article entitled as "Call to a new life: HDP on eve of general elections" was written by Yasin Sunca and originally appeared in Kurdish Question.

The article is as follows: The legislative election on June 7th 2015 is the main political agenda in Turkey. Political parties have already begun preparing for their election campaigns despite the challenging domestic, regional and international conjuncture. One of the two main issues of the electoral agenda in Turkey at the moment is the political manoeuvre of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP-Halkların Demokratik Partisi) which is running for the election as a party instead of with independent candidates. The pro-Kurdish parliamentary opposition participated in elections with independent candidates in the general elections of 2007 and 2011 due to the 10% electoral threshold, yet now, after having obtained 9.8% in presidential elections with their candidate Selahattin Demirtas in 2014, the hope of overcoming the threshold is at its peak. The other issue that is intensively discussed is the AKP’s desire to change the state administration model from a parliamentary system to a “Turkish-style” one-man rule presidential system, which will abolish the separation of powers.

According to many opinion polls released recently, the vote percentages are similar to those of the 2011 election. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP-Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) is the leading party, followed by the Republican People’s Party (CHP – Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), while the Nationalist Action Party (MHP-Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) is in third place. Therefore, the only apparent and realistic way of preventing the AKP from achieving its aim of winning 330 seats, which will give them the opportunity to change the constitution, is by the HDP overcoming the 10% electoral threshold. However, the underlying factors that led to the HDP making the decision to participate in the election as a party are rarely analysed. Many commentators talk about the numbers, percentages and possibilities, but the real story of a project in progress behind these numbers is less considered. In this piece, a summary of the debate on participating parties and the probabilities of election results are discussed, followed by an analysis of the HDP itself, as a political project, and its policies on the eve of general election. 

Highest electoral threshold in world: 10%

Democratisation has been one of the primary issues on Turkey’s political agenda since its formation. However, periodical military coups have interrupted the protracted process of democratisation. Following the bloody coup in 1980, the military junta imposed the current constitution in 1982. Currently, most analysts mention this constitution as one of the sources of the existing problems in Turkey, including the violation of human rights, concerns about the rule of law and many other issues. However, as the legislative elections are looming, one of the primary issues, the 10% electoral threshold - the highest threshold in the world, is once again under intensive debate. Long time ‘victims’ of the 10% threshold, pro-Kurdish political parties and democratic forces in Turkey have tried to circumvent it either through alliances between parties or by running as independent candidates to whom the threshold does not apply.

The AKP came to power in the 2002 election with 35% of the votes and won 363 seats while the CHP won 178 seats with 19%.  Four political parties that received between 5 to 10 percent of the votes could not win any seats because of the threshold, leaving 46% of the votes unrepresented in parliament. Many hoped however, that the democratisation process would gain leverage, because the AKP, unlike its predecessor the Welfare Party, was declaring accession to the European Union as a goal and promising fundamental changes in Turkey, including re-writing a new democratic constitution. Based on this, the AKP increased its power in every successive election and became emboldened by each electoral victory. Eventually, it distanced itself from democratisation, more visibly from 2011 onwards. One of the outcomes of the 1982 constitution, the 10% threshold, is now manipulated by the AKP to prevent the Kurds and other democratic forces being represented in parliament.

AKP vs HDP

Following the Gezi Park Uprising in the summer of 2013, and the corruption scandal involving several ministers and Prime Minister Erdogan himself later that year, the AKP intentionally used a polarising discourse in order to mask the fundamental issues on the eve of presidential elections, which would be held on August 10th, 2014. However Erdogan, by exploiting every possible method, and state resources not available to the other candidates, managed to be elected as president with 52% of the votes. Following his election, the already existing debate on the presidential system inflamed public opinion once again. The presidential system proposed by some AKP members and president Erdogan, is in fact a “Turkish Style” system that gives the power of a sultan to the president. This desired system has therefore already resulted in strong reactions from every sector of society, including some AKP voters.

The AKP aims to win 330 (out of 550) seats on June 7th, which will give them the power to re-write the constitution and take it to a referendum, paving the way for the presidential system Erdogan desires. However, considering opinion polls and the current distribution of seats in parliament, the main obstacle confronting the AKP, is that if the HDP overcomes the 10% threshold, it will win between 55 – 70 seats (the HDP gained 35 seats as independent candidates in 2011 election). This would mean that the AKP (currently holding 312 seats) would lose at least 20 seats to the HDP from the Kurdish provinces alone. Facing such a situation, the AKP will do its best to prevent HDP’s success, including using state resources for its electoral campaign and even resorting to electoral fraud (which they are not unfamiliar with, as proven in the 2014 local elections).

MHP and CHP

The electoral performance of the other two parliamentary parties (ultra-nationalist/racist MHP and nationalist CHP) will not, according to opinion polls, have a great impact on election results and sharing of seats. The MHP has a stable percentage of the votes, between 13 – 17% in the past four elections, whereas the CHP has had between 20 – 25% in the last four elections. Thus, there is no expectation that these parties will win the election. Moreover, from a political point of view the MHP will be challenging the AKP for the votes of the nationalist middle-Anatolian constituency, which can only change the outcome of the election by 2 or 3 seats in favour of one or the other. However things are more complicated for the CHP. The truth of the matter is that the CHP is passing through a difficult phase because of a self-identification problem. Some party representatives declare at every chance that the CHP is a social-democratic party. Nonetheless the appearance of right-wing figures in the party administration, as well as the alliance with the MHP for the presidential election in the summer of 2014 in support of a conservative candidate, have increased tension in the party. This tension has intensified discussions around the right-wing inclination of the CHP. As a result, the CHP has lost part of its Alawite and social-democratic vote in the presidential elections. Furthermore a Kemalist/nationalist branch has recently broken from the CHP to form its own party, and considering that there is little chance for votes to cross from the AKP to CHP or vice versa, there is little prospect of these two mainstream parties beating the AKP in the upcoming election. This then leaves only the HDP to change the balance of power and bring about democratisation in a meaningful and lasting way.

Call to a New Life: HDP

Considering the 9.8% vote that the HDP candidate Selahattin Demirtas received in the presidential elections in 2014, the above-explained political configuration creates an important opportunity for an electoral victory for the HDP. The AKP government’s fatigue and the unpromising political line of the other opposition parties are also two significant determinants that are likely to play a role in favour of the HDP. However these are not essential factors, but rather side effects of the ideological/political structure in Turkey. Since the HDP is promising a new form of politics with a relatively new ideological background constructed upon “Radical Democracy”, the core issue for the HDP in the upcoming elections is to what extent the HDP’s “call to a new life” will be favoured and approved by the peoples of Turkey.

The political formation of the HDP is of crucial importance here and it is impossible to understand the possible election results without taking this into account. The Kurdish Liberation Movement has long been in search of a creative way of explaining its project for the future of Turkey, and the resolution of the Kurdish question to the rest of the society. The ‘golden key’ was crystallised by Kurdish and PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan through his reinterpretation of the concepts of communalism, democratic confederalism, radical democracy and direct democracy. The protracted state of political crisis in the Middle-East not only engulfs the lives of ordinary people with violence, but also forces society to quest for a permanent and peaceful alternative. All these re-conceptualisations were thus accorded to the emerging new dynamics in the Middle-East, and an ideology-based realistic framework was put into practice by the PKK leader. It is this background which provided the Kurdish movement in Turkey with a comprehensive approach towards all other oppressed/denied sectors of society. And as a project, the HDP is a fruit of this general transformation of the broader Kurdish movement. The Kurdish movement managed to convene and lead many left-wing, socialist, ecologist, anarchist and feminist movements as well as several ethnic and religious groups in Turkey, to form the Peoples’ Democratic Congress (HDK). Following that, the formation of the Peoples’ Democratic Party with the participation and support of these same movements/groups was achieved.

As a political party, the HDP marks a new milestone in the traditional understanding of political life in Turkey. Particularly during the presidential election campaign, the HDP and its co-chair and presidential candidate, Selahattin Demirtaş, established a very different political discourse from before, which attracted the attention of conservative voters, even in the middle and north Anatolian regions where the HDP’s predecessors had never before been voted in. The main concept the HDP used was “Radical Democracy,” which is completely new to the habitual political discourse in Turkey. Based on this concept, several slogans of pro-peace, pro-democracy, anti-oppression, anti-corruption, anti-sexism and anti-discrimination were articulated. The communication of this new form of politics was not habitual either: Selahattin Demirtaş developed a humorous, ironic and critical approach and used social media in a creative and effective way, unlike the other conservative, elder statesmen candidates. The exposing of the AKP’s manipulations and also his making fun of “serious statesmen” were attractive and were rewarded by the people of Turkey, the youth in particular. Essentially the political line of the HDP, based on the ideology of Öcalan, coupled with the efforts of young and hard-working activists, succeeded in touching a larger portion of society.

The Gezi Park uprising and the social tension over the corruption scandal were fiercely squashed by the AKP’s dictatorial one-man rule. The AKP started to use a polarising discourse, and as a result society was divided into two camps: pro-AKP vs. anti-AKP. The inability of the CHP to offer a different discourse also nourished this polarisation. Yet the voices of those who did not want to be a part of this dialogue were not sufficiently heard. That is when the political line of the HDP gained leverage, emphasising the commonalities rather than differences, and deliberately highlighting the motto of “Unity-in-Diversity”. The social, religious and ethnic groups in the “political west” of Turkey are influenced by this discourse, and it is very likely that at least a portion of these groups will support the HDP in upcoming elections if no obscuring factor comes into play. The electoral victory of the SYRIZA and its similarity with the HDP in public eyes is also a positive factor for the HDP.

In the “political east” of Turkey (North Kurdistan), some developments increased already high support for the HDP among the Kurds as well. The HDP became an important actor in the on-going resolution process concerning the Kurdish question, both due to its acting as intermediary between each party in the dialogue (Öcalan, the KCK and AKP), and due to its effort to explain the development of the process to the public. Also, importantly, the heroic resistance and victory of the YPJ/YPG fighters in Kobanê against the jihadist terrorist group ISIS, was a historic development in the history of the Kurds, in which the HDP, together with concerned NGOs and the broader Kurdish movement played an important role. The HDP, together with the broader Kurdish movement, uncovered the AKP government’s open support for ISIS, by for instance establishing human chains at the border and making this AKP-ISIS cooperation public. The HDP also managed to host and continues to host thousands of people who fled from Sinjar and Kobane with its own resources. Thus, the hatred of the AKP against any gains made by the Kurds, coupled with the HDP’s dynamic oppositional activism is likely to erase the AKP from the Kurdish provinces.

So in conclusion: the AKP’s one-man rule is leading the country towards a dictatorship in Turkey. The mainstream opposition has collapsed. The CHP and MHP are repeating the same historical discourse which they have done for decades, and which no longer applies to the needs of Turkey’s citizens and is far from embracing every sector of society. The only promising political line belongs to the HDP, which offers a new approach to societal ills and issues such as unemployment, ecology, gender-equality and the just representation of all political, ethnic and religious identities. Once HDP’s victory has been confirmed on June 7th, it will mean a new era, not only for the Kurds and democratic forces, but also for the country and region as a whole.

(nt)